מעשה שבת ב' | צורבא מרבנן - רד | הרב בן ציון אלגאזי

One, it's called easy. Good morning, good day to everyone. We are. Toward the final booklets, the final lessons in the laws of Shabbat. We are in part two and the final one regarding Ma'aseh Shabbat, in Hebrew easier than the laws of Shabbat. So today we will try to bring a few more special ramifications regarding this matter, after we understood last week the whole subject of Ma'aseh Shabbat, the dispute between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda, who we follow in practice, and so on. Today we will deal with some special things regarding the matters of Ma'aseh Shabbat. I will just define it for those who weren't involved last week. There are new faces here, maybe we can do seven blessings. The definition of Ma'aseh Shabbat is, by definition, actions that were done in violation of Shabbat. Is it permitted to use those actions, to benefit from those actions on Shabbat or, alternatively, after Shabbat? I will just state the simple law. We rule in practice like Rabbi Yehuda. What was done unintentionally, it is permitted for everyone to use that work which was done in violation of Shabbat, after Shabbat, meaning neither the one who did the work nor others. And if it was done intentionally, for himself it is forbidden. And for others, it is permitted immediately after Shabbat. If a gentile performed work prohibited for a Jew on Shabbat, that work is permitted after Shabbat. To allow the time it takes to perform that same work , in order, it's a fine, not Torah law. >> It is all a category of a fine and not Torah law. We had three approaches among the Tannaim: Rabbi Meir, Rabbi Yehuda, and Rabbi Yochanan Hasandlar. Rabbi Yochanan Hasandlar says it is Torah law; Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda say it is a fine. Today we will deal with something we already touched upon, which is regarding Ma'aseh Shabbat with Rabbinic prohibitions: do the same rules of Torah law apply here, unintentional means permitted immediately after Shabbat, intentional means only for others and not himself, etc.? Your honor will already bring that up. We will now put things in order, because there is a bit of confusion here among the decisors. The Mishnah Berurah brings in source one before you, page 81: one does not separate. The meaning is one does not separate Terumot and Ma'asrot on Shabbat. It is forbidden to separate Terumot and Ma'asrot on Shabbat because it is called "fixing a vessel," something that is impossible to use, you fix it on Shabbat, this is called " fixing a vessel." So the author says: one does not separate Terumot and Ma'asrot on Shabbat, as it is similar to sanctifying those fruits he separated, and further, it is like fixing something that is not fixed. And if he transgressed and separated intentionally, he shall not eat it, nor shall others, until after Shabbat as a fine. And if it was unintentional, it is permitted for him even immediately. The Mishnah Berurah says here something very interesting. If this separation was done intentionally, it is forbidden for him and for others until after Shabbat. Unintentionally, suddenly Rabbi Meir's approach enters here, that it is permitted to use it even on Shabbat itself. How can it be unintentional? He doesn't know there is a problem with separating Terumot and Ma'asrot on Shabbat. I don't think there is a problem with this; I hope he knows it is Shabbat. I don't want to bring another option to the other side that it is unintentional just because he doesn't know. There are many people who don't know there is a problem separating tithes on Shabbat and. >> Can we also call this "Makar Patish"? >> I don't know about a hammer, that's unrelated. The food itself is ready to eat. The food, as food, is ready for consumption. What does it matter? It's about the food itself. Because Rabbi Chaim is in control of all Sabbath laws , since he is a master of the subject, he already brings up additional things. >> Is there a solution to eat something that... >> What? What? >> Is there a solution to eat or... >> There is no solution to eat, except for the solution that if you make a stipulation before the Sabbath, then you can also separate tithes on the Sabbath. But if you didn't separate them on the Sabbath itself, not only... there is a story, I don't know, it's a Hasidic story, I don't know how to tell you the practical legal ruling. They say that a Rabbi came to Rabbi Shalom Zaltzman in Jerusalem and said to him: "Listen, I forgot to separate the tithes from the watermelons." Now, most things in Jerusalem are already tithed, especially in Mahane Yehuda, so he told the story about Mahane Yehuda. He says to him: "Listen, I didn't separate them and I don't know what to do." So Zaltzman thinks for a moment and says to him: "You are permitted." He says: " What is permitted?""After all, you can't separate tithes on the Sabbath." He says: "No, on the Sabbath you cannot separate them, but if they dropped some watermelon on the floor, and if a watermelon fell on the floor, then it can be considered as if it were already tithed." I am only telling you a story, I don't know all the legal steps that exist and whether one can rely on this, and whether you can eat it. If you want to happily rely on Hasidic stories, then it was Rabbi Shimon Zaltzman, but it doesn't matter, but that's relying on a Hasidic story. This is the story, if you want I will refine it, I will bring it, maybe the story itself exactly as I saw it. It appears in " Torah HaSimcha," there are two parts to "Torah HaSimcha," that is where this story appears. To what extent it is legally correct and holds up, I need to check, but for a story, it's a good thing. If we already talked about the matter of terumot and tithes, Moshe, I remembered another story together with him, that a certain Lithuanian yeshiva student came to him, very pious, and he served him fruits and vegetables to eat . He says to him: "Honored Rabbi, I ask your forgiveness, I have a custom that wherever I go I separate terumot and tithes myself, I don't rely on anyone." He says to him: "That's perfectly fine, you don't rely on anyone?""What, who am I to make you stumble?" He went, brought him a knife, brought him a bag, brought him the formula for tithing, and said: "Just recite the blessing, it's not totally untithed, it's at least*demai*(doubtfully tithed)." And he stands before him, listen, he cuts a piece from every fruit and this and that, separates it into the bag, says the formula, and he says to him: " Simple, tell me, are you done?" He says : "Yes." He started to eat the tithes! He says: "Impudent!""In my house!"" Eating all the tithes that he just separated!" He started to eat them! Amazing, he didn't play games, he certainly didn't like all sorts of foolishly pious people like that. So, so you ate tithes, no more and no less, you finished. >> A Chassidic story, too? >> No, this is a true story, it’s a Litvish story. A Litvish story, it’s real. >> Yes, that’s true. Just like that, a young guy, a chutzpah. Okay, so, uh, so , there is a Rambam in Source Two before you, and here we are ostensibly discussing this matter—what the Rambam held regarding Shabbat activities involving a Rabbinic prohibition. So, let's see: The Rambam says, one who immerses vessels on Shabbat unintentionally—may use them on Shabbat itself; intentionally—may not use them until after Shabbat. There are two innovations in the Rambam here: one, that in the case of a Rabbinic law —because immersing vessels on Shabbat is a Rabbinic law—he also regulates it. Once again, he rules according to Rabbi Meir, that it is permitted to use it even, when? On Shabbat itself. That is for unintentional; intentionally, it is permitted to use them immediately after Shabbat, until after Shabbat. The Biur Halacha says: How can such a thing be? If Rabbi Yehuda tells you that if there is a Rabbinic prohibition, there is no, no penalty, so there is no penalty at all. But if it is a Rabbinic prohibition done intentionally, it implies that even for Rabbi Yehuda, it should be forbidden forever. Ostensibly , there is a difference between a Rabbinic prohibition and not a Rabbinic prohibition—look at the Biur Halacha that appears in Source Four before you —the usage on Shabbat or unintentionally. But this requires further study, says the...the Gra wrote there: regarding Rabbinic work, Rabbi Yehuda held like Rabbi Meir. Regarding Rabbinic work, Rabbi Yehuda held like Rabbi Meir that it is permitted to use, when? Rabbi Yesai, even on Shabbat itself. And it implies there that whether it concerns unintentional or intentional, there is no difference between Rabbinic and Torah law. And so it is implied by the Rambam, who ruled that if one immerses intentionally, one may not use them after Shabbat, and so, it implies that after Shabbat it is permitted, even if not...and the Biur Halacha asks about the words of the Rambam, that he rules like Rabbi Yehuda regarding Torah law done intentionally, what is the law, gentlemen? Forbidden forever! So if that’s the case, Rabbinic law should also be intentional , yes? That it should be forbidden forever. Why does the Rambam permit it after Shabbat in an intentional case? Because Rabbi Yehuda holds that they did not penalize unintentional or intentional in Rabbinic law, but regarding intentional itself, we have not found in the Gemara that he differentiates between Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbinic versus Torah law, and it requires study. The Biur Halacha cannot understand: When do we in fact treat Rabbinic law leniently and rule like Rabbi Meir that unintentionally it should be permitted on Shabbat itself? And when do we say that intentionally we also treat it leniently, that it is permitted and we do not forbid it, what ? Forever, because it’s...after all it’s...it’s intentional. In any case, he rules practically, the Shaar HaTziyun and let's also say the halacha for the matter, nevertheless, for the essence of the law, I do not know the reasoning of the Rambam, why he is lenient intentionally after Shabbat, since he ruled like Rabbi Yehuda, and we haven't found in the Gemara that Rabbi Yehuda differentiated between intentional Torah law and Rabbinic law. These are the questions: Is there a difference in Shabbat activity between, between, between Rabbinic and Torah law ? No. Intentionally, there is no difference between Torah and Rabbinic law—it should always be forbidden. We have already written about this in the Biur Halacha in Siman 318 there. In any case, regarding the law, we certainly shouldn't be stringent here, as the Gra ruled that even for a Torah-prohibited labor we follow Rabbi Meir, and regarding Rabbinic prohibitions, there is certainly room to be lenient. The Sha'ar HaTziyun rules this in practice. Since the Gra rules, as we said last week, that the law effectively follows Rabbi Meir that if done unintentionally [shogeg], it is permitted to use it, when Rabbi Yissa? On Shabbat itself, immediately. According to the Gra, who ruled like the Tosafot, who ruled that the law follows Rabbi Meir, that is the bottom line. We rule in practice that if it was done unintentionally [shogeg] , one may use it, when Rabbi Yissa? On Shabbat itself, immediately. Shabbat on Shabbat itself, this is called immediate; there is nothing more immediate than this, and if done intentionally [mezid], it will be permitted after Shabbat as well. >> Also. >> Also not itself, this too. Therefore, in practice, for matters of Rabbinic prohibitions, we are lenient, pay close attention, according to the opinion of Rabbi Meir. Even though in practice we rule like Rabbi Yehuda regarding Rabbinic prohibitions, in reality, we are lenient like Rabbi Meir with all that implies. Rabbi Avi Noam makes an excellent point following this. Yalkut Yosef rules a very interesting law: if they turned on the air conditioner on Shabbat intentionally [mezid], yes, this, or if they turned on the fan intentionally [mezid]—it is forbidden to benefit from the air conditioner or the fan on Shabbat because it is intentional, even though it is a Rabbinic prohibition. And if they did so unintentionally [shogeg], or if they performed a forbidden act—even though they performed a prohibition, it is nonetheless permitted to benefit on Shabbat from the air conditioner and the fan. And here he also is lenient like Rabbi Meir regarding a Rabbinic prohibition; to use it, when Rabbi Yissa? On Shabbat itself, immediately. Because one may rely on the opinion of the Acharonim. The opinion of the Acharonim refers to the Sha'ar HaTziyun , which is the Biur Halacha, which is the Mishnah Berurah; one may rely on the opinion of the Acharonim who hold that there is no Torah prohibition in generating an electrical current, only a Rabbinic one. And if it is Rabbinic, we can rule even for Sephardim like Rabbi Meir, that it is permitted to use it on Shabbat itself. Are they wrong? Now, Rabbi Yissa, a few more special cases of Ma'aseh Shabbat [actions performed on Shabbat], and with this, we will conclude the subject of Ma'aseh Shabbat. So, A, there is a concept on Shabbat called "mit'asek"[unintentional engagement]. Mit'asek—there is a person who performs a labor initially with intent, this is defined as " melechet machshevet"[thoughtful work], according to the Torah. He performs the conventional labor that was in the Temple or the Tabernacle, including intent. If something is missing, either in the manner of performing the labor or in the intent, it immediately transitions from a Torah prohibition to a Rabbinic prohibition; it drops a level. There is another drop in level: one who has no intention to perform a labor at all. What, mit'asek? He did some action where he was engaged in something, and suddenly a labor resulted; he didn't intend for it and it happened—this is called mit'asek. What happens on Shabbat with mit'asek? The simplest example that can be: a person goes to the wall, leans against the wall to scratch an itch, and in the process, suddenly the light turns on or the air conditioner turns on. Am I permitted to benefit from that result which he did under the category of mit'asek? The Piskei Teshuvot says: error in law, forgetfulness—all of this is generally considered unintentional [shogeg], it is specifically when there is ignorance of Shabbat or ignorance of the labor. But in a case where one had no intent for work at all, such as turning on an electric light by leaning on the switch unintentionally—this is called " mitasek"(you don't just say "mitasek," you have to say it with the right intonation, otherwise no one understands what you mean)—and it is not considered intentional work, so it is permitted to enjoy its light even on Shabbat. Therefore, if a child accidentally turns on a light on Shabbat, before the child was of age, the child is always categorized as a " mitasek," because he has no intent for any forbidden work, as he is not aware of the concept of prohibited labors. In such a case, it is permitted to enjoy the light; you brushed against it and the light turned on—it is permitted to enjoy that light. However, if one turned on the electric switch by hand out of habit from the weekdays—that is certainly an unintentional act, perhaps even bordering on intentional. Someone who enters the restroom, distracted, and automatically turns on the light—that is already a case of an unintentional act bordering on intentional; it is impossible to use it on Shabbat itself, unless relying on the halachic opinion of Rabbi Meir in a time of need, as the Mishnah Berurah states. But to use it is not possible. With a "mitasek," where it turned on by mistake—that is permitted. Does a " mitasek" need repentance? >> Why would he need repentance? >> Yes, yes, anyone who ends up causing a forbidden result needs to repent, you should always do what's safe, and bring a sacrifice too. >> No, no. There is no, no sacrifice for a "mitasek." There is no sacrifice, Rabbi Yisrael, there is only a sacrifice for an unintentional act (shogeg) alone, not for an intentional one (mezid) and not for a "mitasek." Alright, no? There are enough sacrifices. Rabbi Eliyahu would always say to witnesses, before they witnessed a wedding: "Repent." He always blessed the witnesses, even if they were two completely righteous people. He would always take two rabbis from the Yeshiva, righteous men who would not see anything but their own shadows. In any case, they tell them: " Repent, better to be safe." If he didn't know, he shouldn't enter the restroom. >> He shouldn't enter the restroom for something he couldn't do without the light; he can't do what he could do otherwise. If he now wants to read some pamphlet there to travel to Croatia. >> Or to Putin, then he shouldn't read it there. >> Let him travel to Iran, whatever is safe, it's fine. The guiding principle regarding Shabbat actions is: what he could not do without the Shabbat violation, he cannot do because of it. If he could have done it anyway, there is no problem, we have already talked about this—a person wants to go up the stairwell, and a person who doesn't keep Torah and Mitzvot turns on the light for him. If he could have gone up even without the light, let him continue to go up even with the light. That makes no difference. But if he cannot go up without the light, and only the light now allows him to walk easily. He must wait. We mentioned two options: either wait for the light to go out so he doesn't benefit, or take those things from the airplanes, put them on his eyes like that, they hand them out there. Usually, you don't use this on the plane itself, but it's meant for Shabbat, so if you end up in a situation, you have this. Put the mask over your eyes, and then you can go on without seeing anything, just like in the dark, just close your eyes. >> Exactly, just close your eyes, but there's a simpler, more professional trick, that's all. >> A baby is considered as "mitasek"( unintentional actor). >> Yes, a baby is considered as "mitasek". >> Meaning, if he turned on the light. >> Yes, yes, a baby, unless your baby has special skills, but a regular baby just fiddles around, anything done that isn't in the category of labor is " mitasek". >> If he turned on the light, am I allowed to leave it there because I want the baby to be "mitasek"? >> Look, Rabbi Eliyahu says heaven forbid using babies for all sorts of things; it damages the souls of the babies. If you intend it—there are those who take the baby and put them near the light, boom, they turn it on. You are turning on the light and damaging his soul. >> But to remove him, he turned it on. Take him from there quickly or... >> I don't know, I don't know, it's problematic. Look, if it comes to us, Take him off, I don't know what you're doing. I'm not [talking] now, I'm just telling you, if you intend for him to perform a Shabbat violation so that you benefit from it, and you call that " mitasek", and want to use it? Rabbi Eliyahu says: It's damaging, do not use children for all sorts of forbidden needs. Children, it's not...they have a soul and they need to grow in holiness, okay? Ah, Shulchan Aruch HaRav writes another point: something done unintentionally on Shabbat is permitted to be used on Shabbat itself if it was done according to the instructions of a sage who erred; it's called "shogeg"( unintentional). And the same applies to one who forgets that it is Shabbat or that it is a forbidden labor on Shabbat ; all of this is called in the category of what? Rabbi, "shogeg". Remember well : "Mezid"(intentional) on Shabbat itself is forbidden, unless you rely on the Tosafot, Rabbi Meir, etc. So if there is, for example, a sage, that is not "mitasek". >> A sage's instruction is not even " shogeg", it is... >> Why not "shogeg"? >> The labor itself was performed fully. " Mitasek", "mitasek" is the manner of performing the labor. But if an army cook comes now and says to the army rabbi, "My cholent burned," the rabbi says to him, "Take water, put it in, it's fine, it's already cooked as needed." I am a Yemenite, I don't know, relying on that, he went and did it. Suddenly it turns out that it's forbidden; such a thing can happen. The rabbi instructed him, is he in the category of "shogeg"? Is he in the category of "shogeg"? It's not "mitasek ", he manually went and took water and added it. Not exactly "shogeg", he didn't forget it was Shabbat, he didn't forget the act of Shabbat. >> But since he relied on someone else, it is called by definition "shogeg". >> But he did the labor properly, not in that sense, in that grade. >> Yes, we, Rabbi Yisrael, dealt with this matter also regarding Jews who are not Shabbat-observant. Is it called in the category of? "Mezid" has the implication that one must wait until after Shabbat like a non-Jew in the field for them to do it, because a non-Jew—a Jew who violates Shabbat publicly is, according to Halacha, in several respects considered as a non-Jew. He is considered like a gentile, plain and simple. He is not a gentile, but he is considered as one. So in such a case, his Kiddushin—if he were to witness a marriage ceremony, for example—the Kiddushin would not be valid. Can two witnesses who desecrate the Sabbath in public testify to what constitutes a marriage? The marriage would not be valid; the woman could go anywhere without a get. There was an expression—the expression of the Rabbi, Rabbi Ovadia, I didn't—but I heard him in a class—he says: These aren't witnesses, they are two donkeys, he says, it is not, if he desecrates the Sabbath publicly it is nothing, he says, there is no such thing as Kiddushin, there is no valid marriage. That is how Rabbi Ovadia would say it. So, so, so it is certainly invalid. The same applies to the matter of Ma'aseh Shabbat. The Betzelem Rabbi writes: Regarding intentional desecration, a secular Jew’s status is that of one who does so intentionally for this purpose. The Piskei Teshuvot is a bit stricter and says: It is not just intentional; it would be permitted immediately after Shabbat like a Sabbath-desecrating Jew; no, he says it is like a gentile, and therefore one must wait for the time it would take to be performed. Look at the Piskei Teshuvot. The Pri Megadim notes: A Jew who is an apostate to idol worship has the status of a gentile, and he has a clause: not only an apostate to idol worship but even an apostate to Sabbath desecration, it is forbidden to benefit from his work after Shabbat until one waits for the time it takes to be performed. This depends a bit on the inquiry of why one must wait for the time it takes to be performed—is it because I would easily ask a gentile, or because the gentile would do it for me without problems? Here too, seemingly, with a Jew who desecrates the Sabbath in public, you wouldn't necessarily ask him, but he would do it for you easily, he doesn't care, he says what of it, so it is no different. Therefore, he is strict that even with a secular Jew who did something intentionally—came, wanted to treat the guys on Shabbat, I don't know, do something for them—even in this, one must wait for the time it takes to be performed. He would certainly obey if told to desecrate the Sabbath. If that is the problem—that I tell him and he does it—he will do it; he has no problem with it. Well, the Yalkut Yosef writes that one need not be as strict with a Jew who desecrates the Sabbath by waiting for the time it takes to be performed like a gentile, unless he does not do it on a regular basis. If he does it regularly, it is appropriate to be strict and wait for the time it takes to be performed because he is accustomed to it, but if it is a one-time thing, his status is like a Jew who does something intentionally, which is permitted immediately after Shabbat. Well, there is another very interesting thing regarding Ma'aseh Shabbat: something that is subject to a dispute among the authorities, okay? There are many laws of Sabbath work that are subject to dispute among the authorities. Where there is a dispute among the authorities and an act of Sabbath work is performed by relying on a certain opinion, it does not fall under the category of Ma'aseh Shabbat. The most classic example is cooking water that was already cooked from before the Sabbath. As is known, we have three approaches among the Rishonim regarding water cooked before the Sabbath concerning the law of cooking. The Rambam holds that what is already cooked from before the Sabbath no longer has, even if it cooled down, the category of Sabbath cooking anymore . Therefore, Yemenites can take, without any confusion, cold Yemenite soup on Shabbat, take it out of the fridge, put it on the hot plate, and bring it to "hand-burning" heat—there is no cooking according to their tradition. Why? Because the soup was already cooked before Shabbat, and if it was cooked, there is no "cooking after cooking," even for liquids there is no problem. >> Can I eat with him? >> Oh, wait, wait, I'm just about to gain something. Well...he won't give you, but no, God forbid. No, I'm joking, I'm joking, God forbid. Actually, they are very generous people, I'm just...they just slapped a label on them, so, so, so, well, because it all started— where did the whole Yemenite thing come from? I once researched this, poor people. All the Yemenites I know are generous people, good-natured, and everything, everything rests on one thing: they don't have the custom of " Machatzit Hashekel"(the half-shekel). They don't have the custom of the half-shekel, and from that, it came out as if they don't want to donate, God forbid. What is the half-shekel? What is a half-shekel? Is that a problem for them? But from there came all the jokes and all the issues, so I suggest you go back to the shekel to put an end to all these jokes. Anyway, I just did a simple research on where this whole thing started, the root of the matter. Where? Where do we get back to the point? Yes, that is the lenient opinion . There is an opinion that says it should be a little hot, the view of the Rambam who ruled like the Tur, and there is an opinion, the Rashba's: no, if it's not "hand-burning" heat, not hand-burning...is it hand-burning? For liquids, there is "cooking after cooking." Now let's look at this, it's a very interesting thing: the Mishnah Berurah says in source 12 before you, anything that is subject to a dispute in Halacha, whether regarding its cooking or other labors like it, one should not forbid it post-facto. The whole prohibition is only Rabbinic, and since it is a doubt in Rabbinic law, why be stringent? So, a dispute among the authorities is a doubt in Rabbinic law. Based on this, I wrote here in the note: if one heated liquid soup on Shabbat, it is permitted to derive benefit from it...and according to the Rambam, it is permitted to do so even initially. And likewise, if they added to the cooking of something that was only one-third cooked, post-facto it is permitted to derive benefit from it, according to the Rishonim who permit it initially. Right, one-third post-facto is enough to enjoy the food. In short, anything that has a dispute among the authorities as to whether it is a concern in Halacha, it does not have the prohibition of Shabbat labor, why? A doubt in Rabbinic law is treated leniently. Beautiful, according to this , Rabbi Yeshay, let's see some more interesting examples regarding the matter of the dispute among the authorities. Source 13 before you says: "Cooking after baking"–if a person placed bread or something dry inside a first vessel, it is permitted post-facto to eat it, because the law of cooking after baking is subject to a dispute among the authorities, as is known. There are opinions: Is there cooking after baking, baking after cooking, and so on. Not all authorities agree with that. If they did so after the fact, by the way, they asked here earlier: if a man has a Yemeni son-in-law and he wants to put the soup on top of it, is it permitted? Yes, if not himself, it is permitted. He already did it, for you it is also permitted. My daughter can also do it. >> No, your daughter cannot do it. >> Like that, because in your house, not in theirs. Yes, he can. Your daughter, no. Your daughter in your house only eats, does not cook, does not heat, does not want anything, sits like an appendix, okay. >> What, for Yemenites yes? >> Yes yes yes yes, it can. >> Right, right, no problem. What, what son? >> What? >> I will explain it to you after this. True, after all, you ask ostensibly " his wife is like his own body," and you go through all the discussions in Tractate Sanhedrin 9, and Ketubot, and the whole business, but anyway, that's only regarding penalties, no? Regarding the matter of testimony, not regarding other things. Not for everything— " his wife is like his own body." Fine, study it. The discussion in page 9b, Sanhedrin 10a, also in Ketubot 18, and after that come back to me. >> Is it permitted to remember the Yemeni for Shabbat? >> Listen, there was a "Shabbos" in Bnei Brak for 40 years. He did all the forbidden labors for them, a Shabbos , and this is, this is alive. He told them: "Gentlemen, I am a Yemeni from Rosh HaAyin." They said to him: " 40 years?" He said: "I didn't have a livelihood, it was life-threatening, it was permitted for me, so I did it with permission." Yes, so, so, so in source 13 before you, you will see some more examples of Shabbat matters, cooking after baking. We said that, C. He placed an item of food of ours on top of a "Gush"(solid mass) placed in a second vessel. Gush, true, there is a concept called Gush, and there are those who say that Gush will always be considered a first vessel even if it is in a second vessel. Gush, for example, a potato, is called Gush. There is Cholent, the Ashkenazim put something into it. >> A Kishke like that, such a Kishke is a Gush and it is entirely emitting heat. This is, many authorities say that in a second vessel, even so, since it is a Gush, it retains the heat within it like a first vessel, but it is a dispute. It is permitted after the fact to eat it, as the law of cooking with a Gush placed in a second vessel is subject to a dispute among the authorities. So what are the differences in the authorities 'dispute ? We are lenient because a doubt in Rabbinic law is treated favorably, something that was not done in the body itself; we have already spoken about this at length that many are lenient in the matter. A big dispute is regarding the law of "Borer"(selecting) on Shabbat: is it possible to be lenient in Borer? The simplest example that can be that the authorities disagreed on is : there is a salad, the woman made a salad, a fresh vegetable salad. Fresh vegetables, I always say that the Ashkenazim make one fresh vegetable salad and the Sephardim bring fresh salads; that is the difference between both of them. And she forgot the " Rikrai," squeezed a lemon into it, all the seeds fell into it. Guests arrive, the woman goes and collects the seeds from the fresh salad. After she performed the forbidden labor of Borer (selecting) by Torah law, because she selected waste from food, wanting to fix the food in that way. Can sorting in this manner be considered as making the entire salad forbidden? Because he committed a forbidden act of sorting the salad and "fixed" the salad. By the way, this can happen with many things on Shabbat; you don’t notice, you fix some food in such a way, and then it's forbidden, oops. What is "Ma'aseh Shabbat"? The Poskim debated this. Rabbi Ovadia is lenient on this matter, perhaps because it wasn't done to the substance of the item itself. Please look at [18], I will read it very briefly: "And the essential ruling is to be lenient here, since the prohibition of benefit from a Shabbat act is Rabbinic, we can rely on the opinions that say this prohibition does not apply to the labor of sorting, especially if he remixes the waste back into the food, then he is no longer benefiting from the act of sorting." Returning the seeds back, mixing them again, he doesn't benefit from the act of sorting, and then, seemingly, there is no problem. He is lenient. There are those who are stringent. Look at " Orchot Shabbat": Whoever went and sorted on Shabbat in a forbidden manner , it is considered "Ma'aseh Shabbat" according to all opinions. And that is because the food that was mixed with waste was considered spoiled because of it, and the act of sorting is considered a correction to the food itself. And therefore, if one of the household members erred and sorted the waste out of the food, as I told you— took out the seeds, took out the [ unclear] from the salad—it is forbidden for him to eat that food until after Shabbat. Pay close attention not to make all sorts of mistakes with foods on Shabbat, otherwise, you won't be able to enjoy those foods on Shabbat itself. "Ma'aseh Shabbat," nothing more, nothing less. >> Rabbi, but the food isn't spoiled because of those pits. No, but it doesn't matter; you wouldn't serve it like that, right? If guests come, you wouldn't serve it in that form; it's called food not fit for eating. >> Often, in tzevi'im (the army/public sector), there is food on Shabbat. >> He distinguishes between accidental and intentional. But the question is, a driver who does this—does he do it intentionally, as if... >> What about someone who brings the food? Bringing the food is more lenient because he doesn't actually do anything to the body of the food itself, that's what he's talking about. >> But, but there is a distinction between intentional and accidental. >> Yes, yes, there is a distinction. >> So the driver who brought it, that's a Jew who brings...usually we consider him intentional, in principle, because he knows it's forbidden, even though there are Poskim who want to say he is like an accidental sinner, and many rely on this, because even when he knows it's forbidden, he doesn't really know what Shabbat is. Let’s finish, Rabbi Yishai, with one last thing. Source 21: Someone who enters a stairwell and the light turns on, he is desecrating Shabbat. One must distinguish: if there was already a little light in the stairwell before the light turned on, then he can continue, there is no problem. But if there was no light at all in the stairwell, in a way that he had to grope his way in the darkness and couldn't walk, it is reasonable that he is forbidden to use this forbidden light to walk up the stairs as usual. Now he will go up much faster, it's much simpler; he needs to wait until the light turns off. And if the light is not going to turn off, you need to put, as I told you, a screen over your eyes or close your eyes, and go up that way without any problem. >> The worker who enters the elevator. >> The worker who did it, did it for his own need, there is no problem. >> Can I go in with him? >> Yes, he did it for his own need and didn't do anything extra for you, because there is no difference between. >> He takes care of my family's house, so he can enter. He caught the ride, as they say, and he didn't do anything. He didn't ask you: Do you want another floor? Press another button. You know, if a Gentile did it for his own need and did not intend to increase it for a Jew, there is no problem. So much for the laws of Sabbath work, gentlemen. A word about next week: just one thing to remember, there are elections, that is what it is. One thing you chose correctly, and that is to come every week to hear a lesson on Halacha. This is the most correct choice that could be, and about this it is said: Who chose us from all the nations and gave us His Torah. So, now you understood how to choose. Shabbat Shalom.